As internal documents show, the $RBI (-4,99%) increased its cash shipments to Russia three and a half times in the period (3 weeks before the invasion). While an average of 12 million euros was sent per shipment between 2020 and 2021, volumes rose to up to 40 million euros per shipment from January 2022, an increase of 233%. In total, over 500 million euros in cash flowed into Russia during these critical weeks, as investigative Recherchen show.
Timeline:
- February 23, 2022: Last cash orders from RBI employees in Moscow, just 24 hours before the invasion.
- February 24, early morning: An already packed shipment worth around 50 million euros was due to take off, but was "stopped at the highest level", according to internal sources.
- As of February 24: No further transfers - according to the RBI spokesperson.
But even after the invasion transfers were stopped, questions remain: who benefited from the cash that had previously been delivered? Russia expert Jakob Kluge says:
"At this stage, the Kremlin was already preparing sanctions evasions. Cash in this amount rarely serves private individuals, it is a tool for shadow financing or emergency reserves of the state."
The $RBI (-4,99%) believes that all transfers are
"always complied with the rules" and were in line with EU legislation at the time. As early as January 2022, intelligence services warned of an imminent war, but the RBI increased its transfers anyway.
The RBI subsidiary in Russia has been active since 1996, generated 2023 55% of the total RBI profit (1.2 billion euros) and is considered the last "bridge to the West" for Russian elites.
What you can see is that RBI reduced lending in Russia by 37% in 2023, while the subsidiary's total assets shrank by 22%.
However, a complete exit from the Russian business is unlikely. According to $RBI (-4,99%) the approval of the Kremlin. In addition, the RBI license in Russia ensures exclusive access to international payment systems such as SWIFT, which makes it strategically valuable for Moscow.