$LOAR It fits my ideal target exactly. Small, approved niche parts that remain installed in a fleet for thirty years and need to be repurchased. For about four-fifths of its revenue, Loar is the sole qualified supplier. Add to that an acquisition engine that acquires family-run suppliers, enforces price discipline, and uses the cash flow to finance the next deal. Basically, a smaller version of TransDigm. That’s exactly why I’m invested.
Q2 looked good. Revenue of $171.6 million, up 39 percent, with organic growth still at 12 percent. Adjusted EBITDA margin at 40.5 percent, 220 basis points above the prior year, and over nine percentage points better than in 2020. That’s not just a cyclical trend; it’s pricing power on parts that no one can meaningfully replace. Driven by the commercial OEM business, primarily the 787 and A320. Guidance was raised to $665 million to $675 million in revenue and $265 million to $270 million in adjusted EBITDA.
What gets lost in the headlines—and what concerns me as a shareholder more than the record announcement: Reported net income was 16.7 million, flat compared to the previous year—despite a 38 percent increase in revenue. For the first half of the year, it was even below the previous year’s level. The difference between the adjusted figures and the bottom line is interest and depreciation from purchase price allocations. Management counters by pointing to cash flow conversion, which was 1.9 times net income in the first half of the year. Mathematically correct, but the figure looks spectacular mainly because the denominator is so small.
And that’s where things get uncomfortable. With a market capitalization of just under seven billion and estimated net debt of around 800 million, I arrive at an EV/EBITDA multiple of about 28 for this year and roughly 53 times adjusted earnings. Free cash flow is in the low three-digit millions, which translates to a return of roughly two percent. This assumes that the acquisition momentum will continue at this pace for another five to seven years. However, with debt at about three times EBITDA, the leeway for a major leveraged deal is limited. The organic pipeline of about 750 million in potential revenue over five years is solid, but it does not replace M&A. And 12 percent organic growth does not justify a 28x EBITDA multiple.
Here’s something that’s easy to overlook: Loar has been publicly traded since April 2024 and, as a publicly traded company, has never experienced a downturn in the commercial OEM business. The current tailwind comes from increased production rates at Boeing and Airbus—not a permanent state of affairs. I simply don’t know how the model would perform in the event of a rate cut.
Qualitatively, it’s one of the better companies in the supply chain, but the stock price is pricing in perfection at a time when integration efforts are intensifying and the balance sheet is tightening. I would only add to my position if a single acquisition disappoints and the market punishes it with a one-third discount. I would sell under four conditions: organic growth below ten percent, while guidance relies on acquisitions; an adjusted margin that has stagnated for two quarters instead of rising; Debt exceeding four times earnings without a clearly accretive deal. And the most reliable leading indicator: net income that, over four quarters, fails to begin catching up with the adjusted figures.
