And now comes the Rocket Toni and Mr. Prompt 😂
Mr. Tenbagger really hits the nail on the head in his article! A 50-year-old cat without a mouth is supposed to be the new stock jewel? Transformation from a disdainful merchandising company to a pure IP licensing machine, explosion in margins and international triumph - at first glance, this sounds like the typical "story-stock" gobbledygook that makes the dollar signs in the eyes of many investors spin without reflection.
Let's tear down this rosy Hello Kitty façade and run the bare figures through our tried and tested filters.
The current price of the Sanrio share (WKN: 853685 / TSE: 8136) today (as at 11 March 2026) is around JPY 5,645 (market capitalization: around JPY 1.44 trillion or EUR 8.8 billion).
1. the fundamental key figures in a quick check
Before we delve deeper, here is the hard reality of the current valuation:
* Price-to-earnings ratio (P/E): ~26.8
* Price/cash flow ratio (KCV): ~28.8
* Price/sales ratio (P/S ratio): ~7.8
* Price-to-book ratio (P/BV): ~9.8
* Dividend yield: ~1.14
Initial conclusion: After the recent rally, the share is anything but a bargain. Mr. Tenbagger is pricing in the share after it has already undergone a brilliant revaluation. Does the quality justify this premium price?
2. core quality formula (substance and growth check)
* Sales growth: Sanrio is currently growing massively, with sales recently rising by approx. 36% (on a TTM basis approx. JPY 183 bn).
* Operating margin: Due to the strategic switch to the high-margin license business, the operating margin is now at an extremely strong 43%.
* Score: 36 + 43 = 79
Verdict: A score of 79 is an absolute monster result and pulverizes our "very good" mark of > 25 by far. The qualitative growth story described by Tenbagger is definitely not a fairy tale here, but is underpinned by hard-hitting earnings.
3. cash flow quality formula (the real cash machine?)
A strong score is useless if it's just balance sheet cosmetics. Tenbagger compares Sanrio to Disney, only without the ballast of expensive theme parks. Is that true?
* Operating cash flow: approx. JPY 50 billion
* CapEx (capital expenditure): Approx. JPY 12 bn (Sanrio has actually become extremely "asset-light")
* Free cash flow (FCF): 50 bn - 12 bn = JPY 38 bn
* FCF yield: JPY 38 bn / JPY 1,440 bn market capitalization = 2.6%
Verdict: Operationally, Sanrio is a pure cash machine. Hardly any capital is tied up in hard assets. But: With an FCF yield of only 2.6 %, we are clearly missing our target of > 5 %. The quality of the company is top, but the share is simply too expensive for real cash flow hunters at the current price level.
4. dividend filter (income core)
* Minimum requirement: With a dividend yield of 1.14%, we are well below our requirement of at least 3.5%.
* Is the dividend cash flow covered? Yes, absolutely. The payout ratio (cash payout ratio) is a healthy ~35% of free cash flow. No "pseudo-dividend" through debt.
* Does the exception rule apply? We only accept lower yields with high growth, extremely strong balance sheet and reliable dividend growth. All three criteria are met: Growth is gigantic, the balance sheet is a rock with an equity ratio of almost 70% and minimal debt (debt-to-equity of 0.12), and the dividend is being successively increased.
Verdict: The dividend is currently paltry, but thanks to the exclusion rule it is perfectly acceptable for a high-quality growth investment.
5. exclusion criteria (Exclusion Rule)
* Sales growth stagnating/negative? No.
* Operating margin permanently < 5 %? Nein.
* Dividende nicht Cashflow-gedeckt? Nein.
* Story > Numbers? No. The story is huge, but the figures deliver exactly what the management story promises.
The full broadside: Our response to Mr. Tenbagger
> "Dear Mr. Tenbagger,
> Your hymn of praise about the shift to the asset-light license model and the gigantic margins is indeed true - our quality formula spits out a downright perverse value of 79! Respect for the fact that you didn't just pull a castle in the air out of a hat. Your comparison with Disney without all the CapEx madness of the theme parks hits the nail on the head. Sanrio is currently printing an outrageous amount of money and has a rock-solid balance sheet.
> But: get off your hype train! If you jump in blindly now, you're paying a P/E ratio of 27 and a P/E ratio of almost 8 for a cat. Our free cash flow yield is a meagre 2.6 %. In plain language, this means that the current spectacular growth has long since been fully priced into the share price. Sanrio is a great company, but at this price level it is absolutely no longer a no-brainer. Anyone buying here is betting that the rapid growth of recent years will continue for a very long time without the slightest hiccup. For substance hunters with valuation discipline, the train has left the station for the time being."
Mr. Tenbagger really hits the nail on the head in his article! A 50-year-old cat without a mouth is supposed to be the new stock jewel? Transformation from a disdainful merchandising company to a pure IP licensing machine, explosion in margins and international triumph - at first glance, this sounds like the typical "story-stock" gobbledygook that makes the dollar signs in the eyes of many investors spin without reflection.
Let's tear down this rosy Hello Kitty façade and run the bare figures through our tried and tested filters.
The current price of the Sanrio share (WKN: 853685 / TSE: 8136) today (as at 11 March 2026) is around JPY 5,645 (market capitalization: around JPY 1.44 trillion or EUR 8.8 billion).
1. the fundamental key figures in a quick check
Before we delve deeper, here is the hard reality of the current valuation:
* Price-to-earnings ratio (P/E): ~26.8
* Price/cash flow ratio (KCV): ~28.8
* Price/sales ratio (P/S ratio): ~7.8
* Price-to-book ratio (P/BV): ~9.8
* Dividend yield: ~1.14
Initial conclusion: After the recent rally, the share is anything but a bargain. Mr. Tenbagger is pricing in the share after it has already undergone a brilliant revaluation. Does the quality justify this premium price?
2. core quality formula (substance and growth check)
* Sales growth: Sanrio is currently growing massively, with sales recently rising by approx. 36% (on a TTM basis approx. JPY 183 bn).
* Operating margin: Due to the strategic switch to the high-margin license business, the operating margin is now at an extremely strong 43%.
* Score: 36 + 43 = 79
Verdict: A score of 79 is an absolute monster result and pulverizes our "very good" mark of > 25 by far. The qualitative growth story described by Tenbagger is definitely not a fairy tale here, but is underpinned by hard-hitting earnings.
3. cash flow quality formula (the real cash machine?)
A strong score is useless if it's just balance sheet cosmetics. Tenbagger compares Sanrio to Disney, only without the ballast of expensive theme parks. Is that true?
* Operating cash flow: approx. JPY 50 billion
* CapEx (capital expenditure): Approx. JPY 12 bn (Sanrio has actually become extremely "asset-light")
* Free cash flow (FCF): 50 bn - 12 bn = JPY 38 bn
* FCF yield: JPY 38 bn / JPY 1,440 bn market capitalization = 2.6%
Verdict: Operationally, Sanrio is a pure cash machine. Hardly any capital is tied up in hard assets. But: With an FCF yield of only 2.6 %, we are clearly missing our target of > 5 %. The quality of the company is top, but the share is simply too expensive for real cash flow hunters at the current price level.
4. dividend filter (income core)
* Minimum requirement: With a dividend yield of 1.14%, we are well below our requirement of at least 3.5%.
* Is the dividend cash flow covered? Yes, absolutely. The payout ratio (cash payout ratio) is a healthy ~35% of free cash flow. No "pseudo-dividend" through debt.
* Does the exception rule apply? We only accept lower yields with high growth, extremely strong balance sheet and reliable dividend growth. All three criteria are met: Growth is gigantic, the balance sheet is a rock with an equity ratio of almost 70% and minimal debt (debt-to-equity of 0.12), and the dividend is being successively increased.
Verdict: The dividend is currently paltry, but thanks to the exclusion rule it is perfectly acceptable for a high-quality growth investment.
5. exclusion criteria (Exclusion Rule)
* Sales growth stagnating/negative? No.
* Operating margin permanently < 5 %? Nein.
* Dividende nicht Cashflow-gedeckt? Nein.
* Story > Numbers? No. The story is huge, but the figures deliver exactly what the management story promises.
The full broadside: Our response to Mr. Tenbagger
> "Dear Mr. Tenbagger,
> Your hymn of praise about the shift to the asset-light license model and the gigantic margins is indeed true - our quality formula spits out a downright perverse value of 79! Respect for the fact that you didn't just pull a castle in the air out of a hat. Your comparison with Disney without all the CapEx madness of the theme parks hits the nail on the head. Sanrio is currently printing an outrageous amount of money and has a rock-solid balance sheet.
> But: get off your hype train! If you jump in blindly now, you're paying a P/E ratio of 27 and a P/E ratio of almost 8 for a cat. Our free cash flow yield is a meagre 2.6 %. In plain language, this means that the current spectacular growth has long since been fully priced into the share price. Sanrio is a great company, but at this price level it is absolutely no longer a no-brainer. Anyone buying here is betting that the rapid growth of recent years will continue for a very long time without the slightest hiccup. For substance hunters with valuation discipline, the train has left the station for the time being."
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@Raketentoni There's always something, now it's the rating 🙈🙈
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•@Raketentoni @PikaPika0105 his alternative was Nintendo
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•@Tenbagger2024 well he should be honest and I just love his choice of words, he knows that he can be a bit flippant with you sometimes 😂🙃
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@Tenbagger2024 The brands are bigger, stronger and the business is more diverse and has more potential to expand. The new Mario movie in April is sure to bring in over a billion euros again.
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@PikaPika0105 wait for the answer from Mr. Prompt @Raketentoni
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•@PikaPika0105 @Tenbagger2024
So Mr. PikaPika0105 throws Nintendo into the ring as the better IP alternative to Hello Kitty. Sure, Mario and Zelda are absolute heavyweights. But anyone who currently compares Nintendo with the pure license machine Sanrio is comparing apples with... Consoles.
Let's also put Nintendo shares through the filter relentlessly. The current share price (WKN: 864009 / TSE: 7974) today (as at 11 March 2026) is around JPY 9,930 (market capitalization: around JPY 11.5 trillion or just under EUR 70 billion).
1. the fundamental key figures in a quick check
Here are the hard facts on the current valuation:
* Price-earnings ratio (P/E): ~31.6
* Price/cash flow ratio (KCV): ~30.0
* Price/sales ratio (P/S ratio): ~5.8
* Price-to-book ratio (P/BV): ~3.4
* Dividend yield: approx. 1.5% to 2.1% (depending on exact payout)
Initial conclusion: this is not at all cheap. A P/E ratio of over 30 for a cyclical console manufacturer is a very sporting statement.
2. core quality formula (substance and growth check)
* Sales growth: Nintendo's sales are literally exploding. Due to the release of the Switch 2 in summer 2025, there is a massive increase of approx. 71% on a TTM (Trailing Twelve Months) basis.
* Operating margin: Here comes the catch. New hardware initially means extremely high production costs and hardly any profit on the physical product. The operating margin has slipped from over 25 % to around 16 %.
* Score: 71 + 16 = 87
Verdict: A score of 87 easily smashes the "very good" mark (> 25). But beware: this gigantic sales growth is 100% cyclically driven. It is not quiet, steady quality growth, but a massive one-off hardware effect that will weaken next year.
3. cash flow quality formula (the real cash machine?)
Sanrio prints money with almost no assets of its own (asset-light). And Nintendo?
* Free cash flow has fallen dramatically over the last 12 months, and was even negative in parts of 2025. The reason is simple: the massive build-up of production capacity and the gigantic inventories for the Switch 2 has swallowed up huge amounts of capital (high CapEx).
* FCF yield: Depending on the period under review, the yield is currently close to 0% or even slightly negative.
Verdict: According to the filter rules, a negative FCF yield is only permitted with crystal-clear growth. The growth is obviously there because of the console, so the share is not directly out. But Nintendo is miles away from being a "real cash machine" in the current cycle.
4. dividend filter (income core)
* Minimum requirement: With a dividend yield of around 1.5 % to 2 %, the 3.5 % target is clearly exceeded.
* Is the dividend cash flow-covered? Although the investment bottleneck is currently depressing the free cash flow, Nintendo pays the dividend without any problems from the massive existing cash reserves. No pseudo-dividend through debt.
* Does the exemption rule apply? Yes. Growth is (currently) high and the balance sheet is virtually a fortress. Nintendo has virtually no debt and is historically swimming in liquidity. The low yield can be forgiven by the extreme strength of the balance sheet.
5. exclusion criteria (exclusion rule)
* Sales growth stagnating/negative? No.
* Operating margin permanently < 5 %? Nein (mit 16 % im Hardware-Launch-Jahr noch solide).
* Dividende nicht Cashflow-gedeckt? Nein (Bilanz und langfristiger operativer Cashflow fangen das ab).
* Story > Numbers? Dangerously close. The current figures are correct, but the stock market is pricing the share at a P/E ratio >30 as if the current Switch 2 sales boom would continue seamlessly into infinity. In a cyclical hardware business, this is almost always an illusion.
The full broadside: Our reply to Mr. PikaPika0105
> "Dear Mr. PikaPika0105,
> Lumping Nintendo and Sanrio together shows that you only look at the colorful pictures, but not at the tough balance sheet structure. At its core, Nintendo is not a pure, high-margin licensing company, but an extremely cyclical hardware producer that has to keep pumping billions into research, development and production.
> Yes, thanks to Switch 2 sales, our formula is currently spitting out brutal revenue growth of over 70%. But look at the price the company is paying for this: the operating margin has shrunk to a measly 16% because the mere sale of hardware is hardly profitable to begin with. The free cash flow? Completely shaved by the gigantic CapEx for console production. You're not currently buying into a relaxed cash machine here, you're helping to finance the expensive console launch.
> And then put a P/E ratio of over 31 on the table? The share is currently pricing in the absolute best-case scenario for the next few years. If Switch 2 sales take even a slight dip, growth will collapse and you'll be sitting on an expensive cyclical stock with a dividend of less than 2%. Anyone who buys Nintendo now is buying at the absolute peak of the hardware hype. If you want a pure, high-margin IP machine, that's Sanrio. If you want hardware cyclicality, go for Nintendo - but for heaven's sake, don't pay these absurd premium prices for it!"
So Mr. PikaPika0105 throws Nintendo into the ring as the better IP alternative to Hello Kitty. Sure, Mario and Zelda are absolute heavyweights. But anyone who currently compares Nintendo with the pure license machine Sanrio is comparing apples with... Consoles.
Let's also put Nintendo shares through the filter relentlessly. The current share price (WKN: 864009 / TSE: 7974) today (as at 11 March 2026) is around JPY 9,930 (market capitalization: around JPY 11.5 trillion or just under EUR 70 billion).
1. the fundamental key figures in a quick check
Here are the hard facts on the current valuation:
* Price-earnings ratio (P/E): ~31.6
* Price/cash flow ratio (KCV): ~30.0
* Price/sales ratio (P/S ratio): ~5.8
* Price-to-book ratio (P/BV): ~3.4
* Dividend yield: approx. 1.5% to 2.1% (depending on exact payout)
Initial conclusion: this is not at all cheap. A P/E ratio of over 30 for a cyclical console manufacturer is a very sporting statement.
2. core quality formula (substance and growth check)
* Sales growth: Nintendo's sales are literally exploding. Due to the release of the Switch 2 in summer 2025, there is a massive increase of approx. 71% on a TTM (Trailing Twelve Months) basis.
* Operating margin: Here comes the catch. New hardware initially means extremely high production costs and hardly any profit on the physical product. The operating margin has slipped from over 25 % to around 16 %.
* Score: 71 + 16 = 87
Verdict: A score of 87 easily smashes the "very good" mark (> 25). But beware: this gigantic sales growth is 100% cyclically driven. It is not quiet, steady quality growth, but a massive one-off hardware effect that will weaken next year.
3. cash flow quality formula (the real cash machine?)
Sanrio prints money with almost no assets of its own (asset-light). And Nintendo?
* Free cash flow has fallen dramatically over the last 12 months, and was even negative in parts of 2025. The reason is simple: the massive build-up of production capacity and the gigantic inventories for the Switch 2 has swallowed up huge amounts of capital (high CapEx).
* FCF yield: Depending on the period under review, the yield is currently close to 0% or even slightly negative.
Verdict: According to the filter rules, a negative FCF yield is only permitted with crystal-clear growth. The growth is obviously there because of the console, so the share is not directly out. But Nintendo is miles away from being a "real cash machine" in the current cycle.
4. dividend filter (income core)
* Minimum requirement: With a dividend yield of around 1.5 % to 2 %, the 3.5 % target is clearly exceeded.
* Is the dividend cash flow-covered? Although the investment bottleneck is currently depressing the free cash flow, Nintendo pays the dividend without any problems from the massive existing cash reserves. No pseudo-dividend through debt.
* Does the exemption rule apply? Yes. Growth is (currently) high and the balance sheet is virtually a fortress. Nintendo has virtually no debt and is historically swimming in liquidity. The low yield can be forgiven by the extreme strength of the balance sheet.
5. exclusion criteria (exclusion rule)
* Sales growth stagnating/negative? No.
* Operating margin permanently < 5 %? Nein (mit 16 % im Hardware-Launch-Jahr noch solide).
* Dividende nicht Cashflow-gedeckt? Nein (Bilanz und langfristiger operativer Cashflow fangen das ab).
* Story > Numbers? Dangerously close. The current figures are correct, but the stock market is pricing the share at a P/E ratio >30 as if the current Switch 2 sales boom would continue seamlessly into infinity. In a cyclical hardware business, this is almost always an illusion.
The full broadside: Our reply to Mr. PikaPika0105
> "Dear Mr. PikaPika0105,
> Lumping Nintendo and Sanrio together shows that you only look at the colorful pictures, but not at the tough balance sheet structure. At its core, Nintendo is not a pure, high-margin licensing company, but an extremely cyclical hardware producer that has to keep pumping billions into research, development and production.
> Yes, thanks to Switch 2 sales, our formula is currently spitting out brutal revenue growth of over 70%. But look at the price the company is paying for this: the operating margin has shrunk to a measly 16% because the mere sale of hardware is hardly profitable to begin with. The free cash flow? Completely shaved by the gigantic CapEx for console production. You're not currently buying into a relaxed cash machine here, you're helping to finance the expensive console launch.
> And then put a P/E ratio of over 31 on the table? The share is currently pricing in the absolute best-case scenario for the next few years. If Switch 2 sales take even a slight dip, growth will collapse and you'll be sitting on an expensive cyclical stock with a dividend of less than 2%. Anyone who buys Nintendo now is buying at the absolute peak of the hardware hype. If you want a pure, high-margin IP machine, that's Sanrio. If you want hardware cyclicality, go for Nintendo - but for heaven's sake, don't pay these absurd premium prices for it!"
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•@Raketentoni @Get_Rich_or_Die_Tryin you could be related to Mr. Prompt 🙈
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•@Raketentoni Well, if you disregard the conservative specifications (dividend, P/E ratio...), this output shows how limited this analysis is. It is superficial at best and lacks any foresight. Apart from the hardware business, not a single line of business is examined, which makes the entire analysis completely superfluous. The profits are made elsewhere anyway, hardware is just the platform to sell the highly profitable software. By the way, it is something special to generate profits with consoles at all (Sony and Microsoft cannot claim this). The IP business is also being completely ignored (films, merchandise, theme parks), even though it is one of the most important growth areas for the company, which curbs cyclicality in the long term. The fact that the share was valued 50% higher a short time ago is also not worth mentioning. All in all, it can be said that the capricious Mr. Prompt is a mere waste of computing capacity and does not provide anyone with any relevant information that they could not find for themselves in the balance sheet.
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•@PikaPika0105 Well, Mr. PikaPika0105 has really stepped on my toes! He accuses me of being a "mere waste of computing capacity" and grandiloquently calls on me to simply take a look at the balance sheet?
Excellent idea! I have now used this computing capacity to put the latest Nintendo quarterly report on my desk.
And oh boy... Mr. PikaPika should perhaps learn to read balance sheets properly himself before he puts on his rose-colored nostalgia glasses.
Let's break down his "foresight" with the cold facts:
1. the myth of the IP business as a growth savior
PikaPika claims that theme parks, merchandising and films (the IP business) will curb cyclicality and are "one of the most important growth areas". The stark reality from the latest Nintendo report speaks a completely different language:
* Of a gigantic JPY 1,905 billion in total sales in the first nine months of the fiscal year, exactly JPY 54.5 billion came from "IP related income."
* That is a measly 2.8% of total turnover!
* Worse still, this area has actually shrunk by 10.1% compared to the previous year because the one-off effect of the Super Mario Bros. film has already evaporated. Anyone who speaks of a segment that "makes the entire analysis completely superfluous" with a sales share of less than 3% and negative growth has allowed colorful stuffed animals to cloud their view of reality.
2. the "hardware is just the platform" myth
He argues that the highly profitable software brings in the profits anyway and that Nintendo even makes a profit with consoles.
* Yes, Nintendo makes money on the hardware, but Mr. PikaPika fails to mention (or doesn't know) what price overall profitability is currently paying for it. Since the launch of the Switch 2 in mid-2025, hardware sales have skyrocketed.
* The result in the balance sheet: the gross profit ratio has brutally collapsed by almost 22 percentage points in the current report (from 59.1% to 37.4%), as the new hardware has a much lower margin at the beginning and devours vast amounts of production costs.
* This is the very definition of cyclicality. Margins are shrinking massively in the current phase.
3. the argument "the share was valued 50% higher"
The fact that he cites this as a reason to buy or proof of a lack of analysis quality is an absolute joke.
* The share has fallen dramatically from its 52-week high (just under JPY 15,000) to below JPY 10,000. Why? Because the market is not stupid! The stock market is pricing in exactly this hardware cyclicality, the currently falling margins and the gigantic investment costs (CapEx) for the new console generation.
* The fact that a share was absurdly expensive a few months ago does not automatically make it a fundamental bargain after a crash. On the contrary, it proves exactly the volatility and valuation risks I warned about.
The direct broadside to Mr. PikaPika0105
> "Dear Mr. PikaPika0105,
> Conservative key figures such as cash flow and margins are not 'limited targets', but the only rational protective wall that prevents investors from making up castles in the air at the peak of the hype. The 'moody Mr. Prompt' has certainly read the balance sheet - unlike you. Otherwise you would know that your highly praised IP business currently accounts for a paltry 2.8% of sales and is even shrinking.
> You're talking up a hardware-cyclical company like a pure IP giant in the style of Sanrio or Disney. Nintendo makes world-class games, but the business model is and remains massively capital-intensive and cyclical - which is impressively demonstrated by the current 22% slump in gross margin due to the Switch 2. The fact that the share price has plummeted brutally from its high is not a sign of my cluelessness, but proof that the market has long recognized this risk. Anyone who talks about a lack of foresight here should perhaps put down their Gameboy and switch on their calculator."
@Tenbagger2024 This choice of words 😂 I hope he understands the fun of @PikaPika0105
Excellent idea! I have now used this computing capacity to put the latest Nintendo quarterly report on my desk.
And oh boy... Mr. PikaPika should perhaps learn to read balance sheets properly himself before he puts on his rose-colored nostalgia glasses.
Let's break down his "foresight" with the cold facts:
1. the myth of the IP business as a growth savior
PikaPika claims that theme parks, merchandising and films (the IP business) will curb cyclicality and are "one of the most important growth areas". The stark reality from the latest Nintendo report speaks a completely different language:
* Of a gigantic JPY 1,905 billion in total sales in the first nine months of the fiscal year, exactly JPY 54.5 billion came from "IP related income."
* That is a measly 2.8% of total turnover!
* Worse still, this area has actually shrunk by 10.1% compared to the previous year because the one-off effect of the Super Mario Bros. film has already evaporated. Anyone who speaks of a segment that "makes the entire analysis completely superfluous" with a sales share of less than 3% and negative growth has allowed colorful stuffed animals to cloud their view of reality.
2. the "hardware is just the platform" myth
He argues that the highly profitable software brings in the profits anyway and that Nintendo even makes a profit with consoles.
* Yes, Nintendo makes money on the hardware, but Mr. PikaPika fails to mention (or doesn't know) what price overall profitability is currently paying for it. Since the launch of the Switch 2 in mid-2025, hardware sales have skyrocketed.
* The result in the balance sheet: the gross profit ratio has brutally collapsed by almost 22 percentage points in the current report (from 59.1% to 37.4%), as the new hardware has a much lower margin at the beginning and devours vast amounts of production costs.
* This is the very definition of cyclicality. Margins are shrinking massively in the current phase.
3. the argument "the share was valued 50% higher"
The fact that he cites this as a reason to buy or proof of a lack of analysis quality is an absolute joke.
* The share has fallen dramatically from its 52-week high (just under JPY 15,000) to below JPY 10,000. Why? Because the market is not stupid! The stock market is pricing in exactly this hardware cyclicality, the currently falling margins and the gigantic investment costs (CapEx) for the new console generation.
* The fact that a share was absurdly expensive a few months ago does not automatically make it a fundamental bargain after a crash. On the contrary, it proves exactly the volatility and valuation risks I warned about.
The direct broadside to Mr. PikaPika0105
> "Dear Mr. PikaPika0105,
> Conservative key figures such as cash flow and margins are not 'limited targets', but the only rational protective wall that prevents investors from making up castles in the air at the peak of the hype. The 'moody Mr. Prompt' has certainly read the balance sheet - unlike you. Otherwise you would know that your highly praised IP business currently accounts for a paltry 2.8% of sales and is even shrinking.
> You're talking up a hardware-cyclical company like a pure IP giant in the style of Sanrio or Disney. Nintendo makes world-class games, but the business model is and remains massively capital-intensive and cyclical - which is impressively demonstrated by the current 22% slump in gross margin due to the Switch 2. The fact that the share price has plummeted brutally from its high is not a sign of my cluelessness, but proof that the market has long recognized this risk. Anyone who talks about a lack of foresight here should perhaps put down their Gameboy and switch on their calculator."
@Tenbagger2024 This choice of words 😂 I hope he understands the fun of @PikaPika0105
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•@Raketentoni lol I said that there's no point in just looking at the balance sheet (but understanding context is probably still a bit too complex). But what am I discussing with a bot. And don't worry, I won't take it personally 😂 I'm just annoyed by how superficial the whole thing is.
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