But considering the numbers, the sales were actually pretty decent, right? Are you going to up the ante?
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4Semana
@JochenderRochen
No, I completely sold out yesterday; there was another announcement yesterday evening at 7:30 p.m. that prompted me to do so:
NeoVolta has registered a universal shelf registration with the SEC for up to $200 million. Under this, common stock, preferred stock, debt securities, warrants, and other instruments may be issued in the future.
Important: The $200 million won’t be issued all at once today. A prospectus supplement is required for each specific offering. But the financing option is now in place. SEC
The problem is the scale:
NeoVolta’s current market capitalization is only about 136 million USD. The size of the shelf registration thus actually exceeds the company’s entire current market capitalization. The stock price is currently around 2.33 USD, down 26.5%.
A shelf registration alone would not be a reason to sell. But when combined with the rest, it becomes problematic.
I no longer like the financing structure at all
FY2026:
- Operating cash burn: −$15.2 million
- Cash (including restricted cash): only $25.4 million
- Additional obligation for NeoVolta Power of up to $25 million by June 2027
- Already raised $20 million in secured debt in September at a 10% interest rate
- Additional warrants for approximately 1.45 million shares
- and management itself states that future equity and debt financings may be possible.
And prior to that, a massive number of shares had already been issued in 2026:
5.2 million shares at $2.50,
2.1 million at $4.76,
13.9 million at $2.05.
As a result, the number of outstanding shares has risen from about 34.1 million to 58.3 million. SEC
Now a $200 million shelf registration follows.
For me, this is no longer just a theoretical dilution risk. Dependence on the capital markets has now become a central part of the story.
And at the same time, the core business has failed
Q4 revenue:
$13,500.
Not 13.5 million—13,500 USD.
Q4 Adjusted EBITDA: −8.0 million USD.
FY26 net loss: −21.5 million USD.
The residential/installer business has practically collapsed.
As a result, shareholders and lenders are currently financing a complete strategic shift:
the old residential business is broken → the new BESS/Georgia business has yet to prove itself.
No, I completely sold out yesterday; there was another announcement yesterday evening at 7:30 p.m. that prompted me to do so:
NeoVolta has registered a universal shelf registration with the SEC for up to $200 million. Under this, common stock, preferred stock, debt securities, warrants, and other instruments may be issued in the future.
Important: The $200 million won’t be issued all at once today. A prospectus supplement is required for each specific offering. But the financing option is now in place. SEC
The problem is the scale:
NeoVolta’s current market capitalization is only about 136 million USD. The size of the shelf registration thus actually exceeds the company’s entire current market capitalization. The stock price is currently around 2.33 USD, down 26.5%.
A shelf registration alone would not be a reason to sell. But when combined with the rest, it becomes problematic.
I no longer like the financing structure at all
FY2026:
- Operating cash burn: −$15.2 million
- Cash (including restricted cash): only $25.4 million
- Additional obligation for NeoVolta Power of up to $25 million by June 2027
- Already raised $20 million in secured debt in September at a 10% interest rate
- Additional warrants for approximately 1.45 million shares
- and management itself states that future equity and debt financings may be possible.
And prior to that, a massive number of shares had already been issued in 2026:
5.2 million shares at $2.50,
2.1 million at $4.76,
13.9 million at $2.05.
As a result, the number of outstanding shares has risen from about 34.1 million to 58.3 million. SEC
Now a $200 million shelf registration follows.
For me, this is no longer just a theoretical dilution risk. Dependence on the capital markets has now become a central part of the story.
And at the same time, the core business has failed
Q4 revenue:
$13,500.
Not 13.5 million—13,500 USD.
Q4 Adjusted EBITDA: −8.0 million USD.
FY26 net loss: −21.5 million USD.
The residential/installer business has practically collapsed.
As a result, shareholders and lenders are currently financing a complete strategic shift:
the old residential business is broken → the new BESS/Georgia business has yet to prove itself.
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Okay, thanks. Where should I put the money? I'm also thinking about taking the 6% profit and reinvesting it in either Kioxia or the global ETF...
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•4Semana
@JochenderRochen I'm just taking it easy this weekend :) I finished the first part with over 100%, and last night I was still up by a good 30 :D
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Okay, cool—so did you get out before the numbers came out? I messed up and now I've set a stop-loss just above my entry price so I might still catch a small rebound before exiting.
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•4Semana
@JochenderRochen No, when I was up 100%, I sold half of it, and let the rest run freely—but with a trailing stop-loss :)
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Okay. Good luck going forward 🍀 I really need to learn to take some profits... I was up over 100% at one point, too...
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•4Semana
@JochenderRochen Yep, discipline is important. When you're at 100%, always sell half—that way, you can't lose any more money. Also, keep in mind any potential taxes, so sell at around 108–110%, and you'll be safe :)
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