I do the same for @Multibagger, here's the analysis for you using my formulas and I'm into dividends:
Here's an unvarnished look at SES S.A. (LU0088087324) - and I'll tell you right up front: This is a prime example of an absolute value trap, where your hard exclusion criteria are flashing like an alarm system.
Here are the current key figures (as at today, 26.02.2026, share price at around € 6.40)
Price-Earnings Ratio (P/E ratio): Extremely high to negative (In 2024, the bottom-line reported profit was a tiny €15m on €2bn sales. SES often slips deep into the red in quarters).
Price-cash flow ratio (KCV): approx. 2.6 (Attention: optical illusion, explanation follows below!).
Price-sales ratio (KUV): approx. 1.2.
Price-Book Value Ratio (KBV): approx. 1.0.
Dividend Yield: approx. 7.8 % (most recently € 0.50 per share).
The reality check according to your formulas
1. the core quality formula (sales growth + operating margin)
Here your filter experiences a total system crash:
Sales growth: organic growth in recent years has been a complete tragedy (stagnant to negative, mostly around -1% to +2%). The only growth now comes at the cost of the gigantic takeover of competitor Intelsat.
Operating margin: Satellite operators have a high EBITDA margin, but satellites become obsolete and have to be written off mercilessly. If we look at the real EBIT (the hard operating margin after depreciation and amortization), SES is often at a tiny 1% to a maximum of 9%.
Your score: In the best case scenario, you get a score of 10.
Your own judgment: Anything below 15 is weak. The share crashes through your quality grid.
2. the cash flow quality formula & dividend filter
Now it gets really exciting, because this is where the trap beckons:
SES generates massive operating cash flow (often over €1 billion).
BUT (The CapEx monster): The business model (launching satellites into space) is absurdly capital-intensive. CapEx eats up between 600 and 700 million euros a year!
The adjusted free cash flow (FCF) was around € 250 million in 2024. With the current market capitalization of around €2.7 billion, the free cash flow yield is therefore an attractive 9.2%.
The dividend check: The dividend (approx. € 185 million payout) is just about covered by this FCF. But at what price? SES is currently sitting on a gigantic mountain of debt of almost EUR 5.8 billion (net leverage of over 3.7x after the Intelsat takeover). Leaving the dividend untouched in such a massive debt situation borders on balance sheet acrobatics.
3. your ironclad exclusion criterion
You set the rule yourself: No buy if revenue growth is stagnant/negative or if operating margin is permanently < 5 % ist. Beides ist bei SES der Fall. Das organische Geschäft blutet langfristig aus, und unterm Strich bleibt (nach Abschreibungen) kaum Gewinn übrig.
Dazu kommt das absolute „Story > Numbers" scenario: SES is currently selling the grand fantasy of a "multi-orbit revolution", Intelsat integration and the new European satellite network IRIS2. The harsh reality on the books, however, is a stagnating, highly indebted company that has to immediately put every penny it earns back into space just to avoid losing touch with Elon Musk's Starlink.
My conclusion (in a nutshell)
FINGER AWAY! Don't be dazzled by the almost 8% dividend yield. SES is not a real "cash machine", but an extremely capital-intensive, highly indebted infrastructure tomb whose share price has been on a downward trajectory for years (from over €20 in 2017 to €6.40 today).
This is exactly the kind of "value trap" that your own formulas perfectly protect you from.
Here's an unvarnished look at SES S.A. (LU0088087324) - and I'll tell you right up front: This is a prime example of an absolute value trap, where your hard exclusion criteria are flashing like an alarm system.
Here are the current key figures (as at today, 26.02.2026, share price at around € 6.40)
Price-Earnings Ratio (P/E ratio): Extremely high to negative (In 2024, the bottom-line reported profit was a tiny €15m on €2bn sales. SES often slips deep into the red in quarters).
Price-cash flow ratio (KCV): approx. 2.6 (Attention: optical illusion, explanation follows below!).
Price-sales ratio (KUV): approx. 1.2.
Price-Book Value Ratio (KBV): approx. 1.0.
Dividend Yield: approx. 7.8 % (most recently € 0.50 per share).
The reality check according to your formulas
1. the core quality formula (sales growth + operating margin)
Here your filter experiences a total system crash:
Sales growth: organic growth in recent years has been a complete tragedy (stagnant to negative, mostly around -1% to +2%). The only growth now comes at the cost of the gigantic takeover of competitor Intelsat.
Operating margin: Satellite operators have a high EBITDA margin, but satellites become obsolete and have to be written off mercilessly. If we look at the real EBIT (the hard operating margin after depreciation and amortization), SES is often at a tiny 1% to a maximum of 9%.
Your score: In the best case scenario, you get a score of 10.
Your own judgment: Anything below 15 is weak. The share crashes through your quality grid.
2. the cash flow quality formula & dividend filter
Now it gets really exciting, because this is where the trap beckons:
SES generates massive operating cash flow (often over €1 billion).
BUT (The CapEx monster): The business model (launching satellites into space) is absurdly capital-intensive. CapEx eats up between 600 and 700 million euros a year!
The adjusted free cash flow (FCF) was around € 250 million in 2024. With the current market capitalization of around €2.7 billion, the free cash flow yield is therefore an attractive 9.2%.
The dividend check: The dividend (approx. € 185 million payout) is just about covered by this FCF. But at what price? SES is currently sitting on a gigantic mountain of debt of almost EUR 5.8 billion (net leverage of over 3.7x after the Intelsat takeover). Leaving the dividend untouched in such a massive debt situation borders on balance sheet acrobatics.
3. your ironclad exclusion criterion
You set the rule yourself: No buy if revenue growth is stagnant/negative or if operating margin is permanently < 5 % ist. Beides ist bei SES der Fall. Das organische Geschäft blutet langfristig aus, und unterm Strich bleibt (nach Abschreibungen) kaum Gewinn übrig.
Dazu kommt das absolute „Story > Numbers" scenario: SES is currently selling the grand fantasy of a "multi-orbit revolution", Intelsat integration and the new European satellite network IRIS2. The harsh reality on the books, however, is a stagnating, highly indebted company that has to immediately put every penny it earns back into space just to avoid losing touch with Elon Musk's Starlink.
My conclusion (in a nutshell)
FINGER AWAY! Don't be dazzled by the almost 8% dividend yield. SES is not a real "cash machine", but an extremely capital-intensive, highly indebted infrastructure tomb whose share price has been on a downward trajectory for years (from over €20 in 2017 to €6.40 today).
This is exactly the kind of "value trap" that your own formulas perfectly protect you from.
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@Raketentoni I can't quite understand the dividend payment given the high debt burden.
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@Raketentoni That's a radically different view. Is it possible to be so extremely wrong about a share and its valuation?
I'm a bit shocked about appearance and reality.
I'm a bit shocked about appearance and reality.
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•@TradingHase I only work with formulas that clearly show me whether it is a buy or not according to my criteria. This here is a "BumsBude" 😬 you can go short
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•@Raketentoni Are these formulas that you feed into an AI?
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@Raketentoni My dear, I can't tag you. I mentioned you in my traffic light post. Here the stock gets red. Seems to be a similar score to yours
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@Raketentoni I don't see it quite as a value trap. The Intelsat merger has already resulted in synergy effects that can certainly compensate for the decline in the original core business. They will probably not become THE high flyer, but for a pure dividend hunter, a stable dividend with capital preservation would be sufficient for the time being, as cash flow is what counts. However, I am only just beginning to research this unknown stock in detail. Risky with imagination. Let's see
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•@Dividendenopi oh it's all good, everyone as they like. I say everyone has their own strategy 😬 I just like the exchange in the community.
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•@Raketentoni THAT is exactly what makes the community so valuable in my eyes. Not just pleasing the contributor with posts like awesome, super classy and I'll buy immediately. But also to take a differentiated look at the situation. And that, at least I think, is exactly the intention of our machinist😁😉 @Tenbagger2024. Of course he's happy to receive praise, but he's just as good at dealing with constructive contributions, which also shows him that people are looking at the titles and may have different views. I find your reasoning quite understandable and see many approaches that need to be examined before investing, and for me this is a very valuable contribution from you. In the end, everyone decides for themselves. I would say especially with this title... stay tunded
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•@Raketentoni I have one request, if you could perhaps take the time. I'm currently bogged down in $AAD, for whatever reason. I find the "company" quite exciting, even if at first glance there is absolutely nothing to be said for it. But they have made strategic acquisitions, yes on a small scale, and their specialization puts them in a stable position in relation to the big players in my eyes. And if the scenarios of a recovering economy come true, I see a lot of potential there. The dividend will (have to) be cut significantly this year, but I see this as a good speculative entry point to secure a more than adequate dividend yield in 2 or 3 years' time. I would be really interested in your view of the situation as an "outsider".
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•@Dividendenopi I did a quick one for you 😬 I love the choice of words in my promt 😂😂😂
You said it yourself: At first glance, there's absolutely nothing in favor of the "pad". And that's exactly where the problem starts. You're betting on a pure, cyclical turnaround scenario and the fantasy of a recovering German economy.
Let's put the bare facts and figures (as at the end of February 2026, share price after the recent massive crash at around € 28.85) on the table before the turnaround hope becomes too great. Amadeus Fire reported its preliminary figures for the crisis year 2025 just a few days ago.
Here are the 5 key figures:
Price-Earnings Ratio (P/E): approx. 30 (Earnings have imploded massively in 2025, earnings per share are likely to be just under €1.00).
Price-cash flow ratio (KCV): approx. 10 to 12 (operating cash flow is under massive pressure due to restructuring).
Price-sales ratio (P/S ratio): approx. 0.43 (With a tiny market capitalization of just € 157 million and annual sales of around € 364 million. The share looks dirt cheap).
Price-to-book value ratio (P/B ratio): approx. 1.2.
Dividend Yield: Historically absurdly high, but as you have correctly analyzed, it will be extremely painfully capped. Market expectations for the next distribution are around € 0.65. That would correspond to a yield of a meagre 2.2 %.
The reality check
1. the core quality formula (sales growth + operating margin)
The preliminary figures for 2025 are an absolute bloodbath:
Sales growth: business slumped by a whopping -17% last year (from over € 440 million to € 364 million).
Operating margin: Operating EBITA has collapsed to a meagre € 14 million. This corresponds to an operating margin of a tiny 3.8%.
The score: -17 + 3.8 = -13.2.
A negative score! The company is currently light years away from the hard 15 lower limit for "solid" growth.
2. the cash flow quality formula & dividend filter
If the operating business and sales are shrinking so rapidly, there is logically no massive free cash flow left to justify an FCF yield of over 5%.
In the dividend filter, Amadeus Fire clearly breaks the mandatory 3.5% barrier with the expected 2.2%. And the exception for lower dividends ("high growth, extremely strong balance sheet") does not apply here, as growth is currently deep red.
3. the iron exclusion criterion
Here the trap snaps shut without any mercy:
Sales growth stagnating or negative? Check (-17 %).
Operating margin permanently < 5 %? Sie ist in 2025 auf 3,8 % gekracht. Ob das "dauerhaft" bleibt, wird erst die Zukunft zeigen, aber die rote Lampe brennt lichterloh.
Story > Numbers? Absolute check. Your entire investment thesis (stable specialization, recovering economy, fat dividend yield on the cost price in 3 years) is 100% "story" and hope for the future. The hard figures of the present do not reflect this in any way.
My conclusion (in plain language)
According to the strict qualitative and fundamental filter rules for real "cash machines", a tough buy ban applies here. Amadeus Fire has absolutely no place on the safe side of your portfolio.
BUT: We both know that you love extremes and avoid boring midfield stocks. If you consciously view this company as an extremely cyclical "lottery ticket" for the wild, high-risk side of your strategy, the world looks different.
Staffing companies are the ultimate leading indicator of the economy. When the market turns and companies wake up from their hiring freeze, the operating leverage of these heavily punished stocks pops brutally upwards. This is exactly where your hoped-for mega-dividend will come from in 3 years.
You said it yourself: At first glance, there's absolutely nothing in favor of the "pad". And that's exactly where the problem starts. You're betting on a pure, cyclical turnaround scenario and the fantasy of a recovering German economy.
Let's put the bare facts and figures (as at the end of February 2026, share price after the recent massive crash at around € 28.85) on the table before the turnaround hope becomes too great. Amadeus Fire reported its preliminary figures for the crisis year 2025 just a few days ago.
Here are the 5 key figures:
Price-Earnings Ratio (P/E): approx. 30 (Earnings have imploded massively in 2025, earnings per share are likely to be just under €1.00).
Price-cash flow ratio (KCV): approx. 10 to 12 (operating cash flow is under massive pressure due to restructuring).
Price-sales ratio (P/S ratio): approx. 0.43 (With a tiny market capitalization of just € 157 million and annual sales of around € 364 million. The share looks dirt cheap).
Price-to-book value ratio (P/B ratio): approx. 1.2.
Dividend Yield: Historically absurdly high, but as you have correctly analyzed, it will be extremely painfully capped. Market expectations for the next distribution are around € 0.65. That would correspond to a yield of a meagre 2.2 %.
The reality check
1. the core quality formula (sales growth + operating margin)
The preliminary figures for 2025 are an absolute bloodbath:
Sales growth: business slumped by a whopping -17% last year (from over € 440 million to € 364 million).
Operating margin: Operating EBITA has collapsed to a meagre € 14 million. This corresponds to an operating margin of a tiny 3.8%.
The score: -17 + 3.8 = -13.2.
A negative score! The company is currently light years away from the hard 15 lower limit for "solid" growth.
2. the cash flow quality formula & dividend filter
If the operating business and sales are shrinking so rapidly, there is logically no massive free cash flow left to justify an FCF yield of over 5%.
In the dividend filter, Amadeus Fire clearly breaks the mandatory 3.5% barrier with the expected 2.2%. And the exception for lower dividends ("high growth, extremely strong balance sheet") does not apply here, as growth is currently deep red.
3. the iron exclusion criterion
Here the trap snaps shut without any mercy:
Sales growth stagnating or negative? Check (-17 %).
Operating margin permanently < 5 %? Sie ist in 2025 auf 3,8 % gekracht. Ob das "dauerhaft" bleibt, wird erst die Zukunft zeigen, aber die rote Lampe brennt lichterloh.
Story > Numbers? Absolute check. Your entire investment thesis (stable specialization, recovering economy, fat dividend yield on the cost price in 3 years) is 100% "story" and hope for the future. The hard figures of the present do not reflect this in any way.
My conclusion (in plain language)
According to the strict qualitative and fundamental filter rules for real "cash machines", a tough buy ban applies here. Amadeus Fire has absolutely no place on the safe side of your portfolio.
BUT: We both know that you love extremes and avoid boring midfield stocks. If you consciously view this company as an extremely cyclical "lottery ticket" for the wild, high-risk side of your strategy, the world looks different.
Staffing companies are the ultimate leading indicator of the economy. When the market turns and companies wake up from their hiring freeze, the operating leverage of these heavily punished stocks pops brutally upwards. This is exactly where your hoped-for mega-dividend will come from in 3 years.
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