3Mo·

Loar Holdings - Business Is Strong, but the Price Is the Problem

$LOAR It fits my ideal target exactly. Small, approved niche parts that remain installed in a fleet for thirty years and need to be repurchased. For about four-fifths of its revenue, Loar is the sole qualified supplier. Add to that an acquisition engine that acquires family-run suppliers, enforces price discipline, and uses the cash flow to finance the next deal. Basically, a smaller version of TransDigm. That’s exactly why I’m invested.


Q2 looked good. Revenue of $171.6 million, up 39 percent, with organic growth still at 12 percent. Adjusted EBITDA margin at 40.5 percent, 220 basis points above the prior year, and over nine percentage points better than in 2020. That’s not just a cyclical trend; it’s pricing power on parts that no one can meaningfully replace. Driven by the commercial OEM business, primarily the 787 and A320. Guidance was raised to $665 million to $675 million in revenue and $265 million to $270 million in adjusted EBITDA.


What gets lost in the headlines—and what concerns me as a shareholder more than the record announcement: Reported net income was 16.7 million, flat compared to the previous year—despite a 38 percent increase in revenue. For the first half of the year, it was even below the previous year’s level. The difference between the adjusted figures and the bottom line is interest and depreciation from purchase price allocations. Management counters by pointing to cash flow conversion, which was 1.9 times net income in the first half of the year. Mathematically correct, but the figure looks spectacular mainly because the denominator is so small.


And that’s where things get uncomfortable. With a market capitalization of just under seven billion and estimated net debt of around 800 million, I arrive at an EV/EBITDA multiple of about 28 for this year and roughly 53 times adjusted earnings. Free cash flow is in the low three-digit millions, which translates to a return of roughly two percent. This assumes that the acquisition momentum will continue at this pace for another five to seven years. However, with debt at about three times EBITDA, the leeway for a major leveraged deal is limited. The organic pipeline of about 750 million in potential revenue over five years is solid, but it does not replace M&A. And 12 percent organic growth does not justify a 28x EBITDA multiple.


Here’s something that’s easy to overlook: Loar has been publicly traded since April 2024 and, as a publicly traded company, has never experienced a downturn in the commercial OEM business. The current tailwind comes from increased production rates at Boeing and Airbus—not a permanent state of affairs. I simply don’t know how the model would perform in the event of a rate cut.


Qualitatively, it’s one of the better companies in the supply chain, but the stock price is pricing in perfection at a time when integration efforts are intensifying and the balance sheet is tightening. I would only add to my position if a single acquisition disappoints and the market punishes it with a one-third discount. I would sell under four conditions: organic growth below ten percent, while guidance relies on acquisitions; an adjusted margin that has stagnated for two quarters instead of rising; Debt exceeding four times earnings without a clearly accretive deal. And the most reliable leading indicator: net income that, over four quarters, fails to begin catching up with the adjusted figures.

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2 Commentaires

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Loar Holdings (NYSE: LOAR) WATCH 🟡

The business focuses on highly engineered aerospace and defense components where certification, qualification requirements and switching costs create meaningful barriers to entry.

Moat: ~75/100

The aftermarket component is particularly attractive, providing long product lives and recurring demand.

Growth & capital allocation

Loar has an impressive acquisition track record, with 18 acquisitions since 2012. Its strategy is to acquire niche businesses with proprietary products and strong aftermarket positions, then expand their EBITDA through operational improvements and cross-selling.

This creates a potentially powerful M&A compounding engine.

Growth runway: 90/100
Reinvestment runway: 94/100
Management/capital allocation: 88/100

Main risk: leverage

The weak point is the balance sheet.

Recent acquisitions increased debt materially, and interest expense has risen significantly. The investment case therefore depends partly on the company successfully integrating acquisitions and converting EBITDA growth into FCF and deleveraging.

This is manageable, but it prevents us from treating LOAR as a low-risk compounder.

Valuation

At $77.41, valuation is the main problem.

Against 2026 adjusted EPS guidance of $1.32–1.36, the stock trades at roughly 57–59x adjusted earnings.

That is a very demanding valuation, even for a company growing this quickly.

My approximate valuation framework:

* Bear: $50–60
* Base: $68–82
* Bull: $100–120+

Factor Score
Business Quality 87/100
Moat 75/100
Growth 90/100
Reinvestment Runway 94/100
Management 88/100
Balance Sheet 55/100
Valuation 35/100

Business Quality Score: ~80/100

Investment Score at $77.41: ~56/100

Verdict

WATCH 🟡 — excellent business, insufficient margin of safety.

My preferred entry zones:

* <$65: increasingly interesting
* $55–60: likely BUY
* $45–50: potential STRONG BUY

The key takeaway is that LOAR is a company i want to own, but not at any price. At $77.41, the quality is already largely reflected in the valuation.
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I’ve been looking more closely at LOAR and, although I still like the business a lot, I became more cautious when I took the analysis into the new layer I’ve recently added to my method. I didn’t just project sales and EBITDA. I tried to go all the way to what actually matters to the shareholder, using the sequence sales → net margin → PER → number of shares → EPS → future share price → expected return.

The starting point is very strong. In 2025, revenue reached $496M, up 23.2%, with 12.7% organic growth. In Q2 2026, revenue reached $171.6M, up 39.4%, with adjusted EBITDA of $69.4M and a 40.5% margin. Full-year 2026 guidance was also raised to $665–675M in revenue and $265–270M in adjusted EBITDA. LOAR Investor Relations

But this is where I think the analysis gets more interesting. I don’t assume that 20–30% historical growth can simply be carried forward for the next ten years. In my sales forecast I weigh historical growth, the most recent years, analyst estimates, the growth of the markets in which LOAR operates, its competitive position and its financial capacity to keep growing through acquisitions. The resulting estimate is therefore considerably more conservative than simply extrapolating the past.

I then do the same with net margin. And here there is a big difference between looking at a ~40% EBITDA margin and looking at what actually reaches shareholders. In Q2, for example, LOAR generated $69.4M of adjusted EBITDA but only $16.7M of net income. Interest expense, amortization and the cost of acquisitions matter a lot between EBITDA and EPS.

I also forecast the number of shares, because earnings growth does not automatically translate into EPS growth if dilution continues. From there I estimate future EPS and apply a normalized PER rather than assuming that today’s multiple, which already prices in a lot of future growth, can be maintained indefinitely.

That is where my conclusion becomes a little more cautious. I still think LOAR is an excellent business and the recent results reinforce the operational thesis, but at the current valuation I need to assume quite a lot for the numbers to deliver the return I’m looking for. So, for now, I see LOAR more as a company worth following very closely than as an immediate buy. If the growth continues to be confirmed and the valuation gives us some margin of safety, the story could become very interesting.
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